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Abstract
We estimate the earnings, hours and income effects of job loss for a representative
sample of UK workers from 1991–2007. We follow workers before and after job loss,
regardless of their labour market state, and we match displaced workers with similar
non-displaced workers. This provides a more comprehensive picture of the effect of
job loss in the UK than previously available. Job loss causes a long-run reduction in
income which is mainly due to reductions in monthly pay rather than in employment
propensity. Income from other labour market states and from welfare payments does
little to compensate for income losses. This lack of a “safety net” means that job loss
in the UK has a similar impact to job loss in the US.
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1 Introduction
Every year in the UK, one in every four workers will end their current employment spell,
and one in every six of these will do so because they lose their job.1 Evidence shows that job
loss, or displacement, has a large and persistent impact on workers’ earnings and well-being
in general.2 Quantifying the size of these losses, and understanding how workers respond
to displacement is therefore important from the perspective of policy-makers wishing to
ameliorate its impact. However, systematic evidence for the UK is surprisingly limited.
We therefore provide new and more comprehensive evidence of the costs of displacement
in the UK. We follow workers for up to a decade after displacement across all subsequent
labour market states and therefore track all individual sources of income, including welfare
payments. Earlier studies have typically considered these aspects in isolation; we provide
a unified treatment. We show that the patterns of wage and employment loss are more
similar to those in the US compared to those in other European countries. Displaced
workers in the UK typically do not remain unemployed for long, but if they re-enter
employment it is in lower-paying jobs. Income from alternative sources, such as self-
employment and welfare benefits, does little to compensate displaced workers.
The existing literature on the effects of displacement typically finds that there are
very large short-term consequences on employment and earnings, and that earnings losses
persist for many years. Studies for the US include Ruhm (1991), Jacobson et al. (1993)
(henceforth JLS) and more recently Couch and Placzek (2010) and Davis and von Wachter
(2011). Since JLS, it has become increasingly common to rely on administrative data,
such as social security earnings records, to estimate the cost of displacement. These data
offer several advantages. They provide an externally validated measure of displacement
based on plant closure or large employment reductions, accurate measures of earnings,
and large samples. However, administrative data are often silent on what happens to
displaced workers who leave employment and enter other labour market states such as
self-employment, training or early retirement. Administrative data also often contain little
demographic information which would allow the construction of suitable counterfactuals.
11991–2008, BHPS. See Table 1.
2The literature has considered the costs of displacement on outcomes including health and mortality,
family dissolution, fertility and the educational success of the children of displaced workers.
2
Finally, administrative data rarely contain information on working time, which means that
one cannot determine whether falls in pay are caused by reductions in hours or wages.
It remains the case that very little is known about the effects of job displacement in
the UK. Administrative data (such as social security records) are not currently available to
researchers in the UK. The only existing estimates of the earnings losses of displacement
come from Borland et al. (2002), who use household survey data from the early 1990s and
Hijzen et al. (2010), who use employer survey data matched to firm registers for the period
1994–2003.3 The UK is an interesting test-case for the study of displacement because it
has one of the lowest levels of employment protection in the OECD,4 and also offers very
low state benefits for unemployed workers.5 An important issue then is whether these
institutional features lead to similar post-displacement earnings and income patterns to
other “flexible” labour markets such as the US.
In this paper we use household survey data, which offers a number of advantages over
the available administrative datasets. First, we can follow individuals through all labour
market states before and after displacement. This means that we do not need to exclude
individuals from the analysis who subsequently have zero earnings from employment.6
Second, we have information on income from all sources, including welfare payments and
earnings from self-employment. This allows us to directly assess the extent to which
alternative sources of income and the welfare system compensate for lost earnings. Third,
survey data from a long panel allows us to use a much richer set of pre-displacement
characteristics with which we can match displaced and non-displaced workers. Finally,
we are able to decompose changes in pay into changes in wages and hours of work. In
contrast to the earlier work using survey data for the UK (Borland et al., 2002), we are
able to follow a larger sample of displaced workers over a much longer period of time. Our
methods allow us to measure earnings loss at various points in time after displacement,
and also allow us to follow workers regardless of their subsequent labour market state.7 In
3Doiron and Mendolia (2011) use the same survey data as in our paper to study the effects of displace-
ment on divorce, which we discuss in more detail in Section 2.
4See Venn (2009), which ranks the UK 38th out of 40 for the extent of employment protection.
5OECD measures from http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesstatistics.htm show that the
UK has the least generous net replacement rates for the initial phase of unemployment in the OECD.
6This is a common restriction used by those with social security earnings data.
7Borland et al. (2002) only compare earnings for those workers who return to employment after dis-
placement. By definition, this is a selected sample of displaced workers.
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addition, we explicitly construct matched treatment and control groups and use methods
which allow us to directly compare our results with those from other countries.
However, the use of survey data also has some limitations. First, our measure of
displacement is self-reported rather than inferred from plant closure or employment re-
ductions. It therefore seems possible that some of the displacements we observe are not
the result of job destruction which is exogenous to the individual. To mitigate this, we
compare displaced workers to non-displaced workers who have observably similar pre-
displacement characteristics and labour market outcomes, and we allow for selection on
unobserved fixed characteristics. We also compare workers who report “redundancy” as
opposed to “dismissal”. Second, self-reported displacements may suffer from recall bias
(for example, respondents may be more likely to accurately recall more costly events). To
mitigate this possibility, we consider only recall information from the previous 12 months.
Finally, our survey data has smaller sample sizes which limit the extent to which we can
reliably estimate the impact of displacement on narrowly defined sub-groups.
We show that job displacement in the UK causes an immediate loss in income of
nearly 40%, and a long-run reduction in income of approximately 10%. These estimates
are similar to the only comparable results for the UK (Hijzen et al., 2010). However, the
estimated composition of the loss is different. Hijzen et al. found that the majority of
earnings loss is accounted for by lower employment rates rather than lower earnings. In
contrast, the results in this paper show that the majority of the long-run loss (80%) is
accounted for by a reduction in post-displacement earnings rather than lower employment
rates. This suggests that the consequences of displacement in the UK are very similar
to the US. Couch and Placzek (2010), who use a comparable methodology, find imme-
diate losses of 32% and long-run losses of 12%. Our results are also consistent with the
large US literature which uses survey data, and which therefore relies on self-reported
displacement.8
We do find a small long-run reduction in the probability of employment, because
some displaced workers enter a variety of other labour market states, namely long-term
unemployment, self-employment, sickness or disability and early retirement. However,
8See Table 1 in Couch and Placzek (2010).
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income from these sources does little to compensate the income losses following displace-
ment. Total income from other sources, including self-employment income, unemployment
insurance, retirement income and invalidity benefit reduce losses by only 15% in the first
12 months after displacement, and by about 12% after 10 years.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we explain how our paper relates to
the existing literature on job displacement. In Section 3 we describe the data that we use
and how we construct a measure of displacement. Section 4 explains our basic method,
which is a variant of a standard difference-in-difference model. In Section 5 we illustrate
the basic patterns in the data and in Section 6 we report the effects of displacement on
earnings and non-labour income as well as hours of work. Section 7 concludes and discusses
our findings in the context of the “flexibility” of the UK labour market.
2 Literature review
This paper relates to three main areas of the literature that examine the impact of job
displacement. The first is the long run impact on employment and earnings. The seminal
article is JLS, who use administrative data for Pennsylvania between 1980 and 1986 to ex-
amine the earnings losses of high seniority men who separate from plants which experience
large (> 30%) employment falls. They find that even six years after the event, earnings
losses remain at 25% compared to pre-displacement levels. These contrast with somewhat
smaller estimates using survey data such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Stevens,
1997) and the Displaced Worker Survey (Farber, 1997). Couch and Placzek (2010) argue
that these very large estimated losses are primarily due to the fact that JLS examine a
period of particularly high displacement among manufacturing workers in a heavily in-
dustrialised state. To demonstrate this, Couch and Placzek use similar data, but examine
Connecticut from 1993–2004. Although immediate losses remain high at 32–33%, the es-
timates of long run losses are reduced to 13–15% after six years.9 These are in the range
of earlier estimates. They are also remarkably consistent with the analysis of Morissette
9Couch et al. (2011) retain the assumption found in Jacobson et al. (1993) that individuals must have
positive earnings in every year post displacement. When they drop this assumption losses rise by 15-18%:
See footnote 14.
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et al. (2013) for Canada. For the UK, Hijzen et al. (2010), using employer survey data
matched to firm registers, also find large and persistent effects. In the first five years,
losses from firm closure are in the range 18–35% and for mass layoffs 14–25%. However,
in contrast to the US literature, Hijzen et al. (2010) argue that these are substantially the
result of the high and persistent non-employment rates of the displaced rather than lower
earnings on return to work. Couch and Placzek (2010) emphasise the potential impor-
tance of the use of matching estimators to control for systematic selection in those who are
displaced, although they find only weak evidence for an overstatement of the estimated
impact of displacement without matching, perhaps because they have a limited number
of demographic variables available for matching.
The second related area concerns the impact of welfare payments on the earnings
losses of the displaced and whether this can lead to systematic differences between coun-
tries.10 Welfare payments can provide temporary compensation for short-term earnings
losses, but may also prolong search. Increased search duration has two countervailing
effects on earnings losses because as well as extending periods out of work, it may also
lead to higher post-displacement wages.11
Schmieder et al. (2010) use administrative data to examine mass layoffs in West
Germany in 1982. Those displaced from stable jobs have long term earnings losses of 10–
15%. This is mainly due to a decline in post-displacement wages, as in the US. Schmieder
et al. note that although they are examining displacement in a recession year, which may
lead to larger losses, they argue that earlier studies using survey data which find smaller
losses for Germany (e.g. Burda and Mertens, 2001) include workers subject to temporary
layoffs whose losses are likely to much lower. They also show that, even in a country such
as Germany with a relatively generous welfare system, the payments only compensate for a
small fraction of the earnings losses and only in the immediate aftermath of displacement.
Ehlert (2012) examines the role that welfare benefits play in moderating the impact
of transitions from work to unemployment using survey data in both the US and Germany.
10See OECD (2013) for a summary table of other studies.
11For the US, both Couch and Placzek (2010) and Jacobson et al. (1993) find that earnings losses and
wage losses are actually concentrated among those that claim benefits. This is because only those that
cannot find immediate employment register to receive benefits.
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The methodology makes it difficult to make direct comparisons because the sample includes
both voluntary and involuntary job separations. Nevertheless, Ehlert does find similar
post-displacement trajectories for displaced workers in both countries.12 However, men in
the US rely relatively more on family resources to buffer their income compared to men in
Germany, who rely more heavily on the welfare state. Womens’ income losses are mainly
compensated by higher partner earnings in both countries. Single individuals suffer in the
US in particular, as they lack both state and family support.
Nordic countries are regarded as having the most comprehensive social safety nets.
Eliason (2011) examines the long-run effects of plant closures, and the potentially miti-
gating impact of social insurance using longitudinal data for Sweden. He finds significant
and long-lasting impacts of displacement on the earnings of married males, but somewhat
smaller than that found for the US.13 Average annual losses are approximately 6% 4–12
years after plant closure. Eliason finds a big initial uptake in unemployment insurance,
but only limited impacts on sickness/disability insurance or other means tested benefits.
Hardoy and Schøne (2014) look at the role that the welfare state plays in mitigating
income losses from displacement in 2002 using register data for Norway. The authors
also account for family effects and tax payments. They find that annual earnings decline
by only approximately 5% after displacement and, although they only have three post-
displacement years, argue this effect is persistent.14 Norway has a particularly generous
welfare system in comparison to most countries and 15–20% of short term losses are
compensated by unemployment benefits. However, once health-related benefits, public
transfers and changes to tax are accounted for, the negative impact on the household is
reduced by 65%.
The third area to which our paper relates is whether displacement leads to entry into
other labour market states, such as self-employment or early retirement. For example,
Farber (1999) uses the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) for 1994 and 1996 and examines
the status of individuals a year after displacement. He finds high entry rates of dis-
12Comparisons with other studies are also hindered because Ehlert considers household income of married
couples rather than individual income.
13No effect is found for married women.
14This result is comparable to that of Huttunen et al. (2011), who estimate an initial loss of 4.8%, which
remains at 3% after seven years.
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placed workers into alternative work arrangements as a temporary state before re-entering
employment. Von Greiff (2009) estimates that displacement doubles the probability of
entering self-employment within one year of the displacement. Fairlie and Krashinsky
(2012) examine business creation using the PSID and CPS. Although the focus is on liq-
uidity constraints, they analyse data separately for job losers and non-job losers. The find
high entry rates into self-employment from wealthy elderly job losers who have both the
necessary capital and relatively poor alternative employment prospects. Such an effect is
also found by Nykvist (2008) using register-based data for Sweden. Examining the im-
pact of plant closures in 1987 and 1988 she finds that displacement almost doubles the
likelihood of entry into self-employment and those in worse labour market positions react
more strongly.15
Turning to the impact on retirement, Chan and Stevens (1999, 2001) find, for the
US, that men who are displaced postpone retirement in an attempt to rebuild savings.
Tatsiramos (2010), using household survey data on 45-64 year olds from the European
Community Household Panel from Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain, finds that individ-
uals in those countries which offer relatively generous unemployment benefits and early
retirement provisions are less likely to return to work before 60 and more likely to retire
post 60. For Norway, Huttunen et al. (2011) find that the most important impact of dis-
placement is not in terms of reduced earnings, but in terms of the probability of movement
out of the labour force due to the generosity of early retirement schemes and disability
pensions.
In this paper we provide the first comprehensive evidence of the costs of job displace-
ment in the UK which takes into account all three of these aspects. We consider short- and
long-term losses; we consider the effect of welfare payments; and we consider the effect
of transitions into other labour market states. Further, we are able to precisely match
displaced workers with a comparable control group thanks to detailed pre-displacement
characteristics.
15Other papers examining this topic include Reize (2000), Caliendo and Kritikos (2010) and Niefert
(2010).
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3 The data
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is an annual survey of about 5,500 households
recruited in 1991, containing approximately 10,000 interviewed individuals. The sample is
intended to be nationally representative. Adults in the sample are re-interviewed annually;
children are interviewed when they reach the age of 16. Individuals in the sample are
followed regardless of whether they remain in the same household or join new households.
The BHPS continued until 2008, when it was replaced by and incorporated into the UK
Household Longitudinal Survey (HLS).16
We use data from all BHPS waves 1–18, interviews for which took place from 1991
to 2009. After appending all 18 waves, the data contain 32,379 individuals and 238,992
person-years. We use all members of the original sample who have full interview outcomes,
which results in a sample containing 29,264 individuals and 219,592 person-years. The
data are an (approximately) annual panel. For each individual we observe a sequence
of interviews from waves 1991 to 2009.17 The median duration between interviews is
almost exactly one year, and 90% of interviews take place within 400 days of the previous
interview. Each respondent is asked to report their current labour market status at the
time of the interview. In addition, they are asked for information on any labour market
spells which began after the 1st September in the previous year, including start and end
dates and the reasons why jobs ended.
Using the recall information from the following year’s interview, we calculate when
the spell in progress at the date of interview ended, and the reason why it ended.18 In
our basic specification, displacement is defined as occurring if an employment spell ends
due to “redundancy” or “dismissal” (the full list is given in Appendix A.) As noted by
Borland et al. (2002), the distinction between redundancy and dismissal in the UK is
16The first interviews for the BHPS sample in the HLS did not take place until 2010 and 2011, meaning
that there is a much larger gap (median 645 days) between the final interview in the BHPS and the first
interview in the HLS, during which labour market status and earnings are not recorded. We therefore use
only BHPS data in this paper. A detailed description of the BHPS data can be found in Taylor et al.
(2010). The HLS is described in Institute for Social and Economic Research (2011).
17The precise interview date varies over the year, although 85% of interviews take place in September,
October or November. A small number of interviews take place in the following year, hence some interviews
take place in 2009.
18The precise method for creating the link between the recall information from wave t+1 and the current
information from wave t is described in detail in Appendix A.
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Year
Number of
obs.
Number of
emp. spells
Prop. emp.
spells ending
in displacement
Prop. emp.
spells ending
other reasons
Prop. emp.
spells
continuing
1991 8,309 4,093 0.058 0.168 0.774
1992 7,907 3,852 0.062 0.187 0.751
1993 7,873 3,782 0.050 0.197 0.753
1994 7,970 3,877 0.052 0.208 0.740
1995 8,027 3,994 0.049 0.191 0.760
1996 8,483 4,277 0.042 0.214 0.745
1997 8,164 4,230 0.047 0.224 0.729
1998 8,076 4,212 0.045 0.229 0.726
1999 9,129 4,580 0.045 0.226 0.730
2000 10,667 5,555 0.046 0.230 0.723
2001 16,142 7,867 0.042 0.194 0.764
2002 14,501 7,110 0.039 0.204 0.757
2003 14,647 7,375 0.034 0.204 0.761
2004 13,293 6,644 0.036 0.205 0.759
2005 13,371 6,669 0.036 0.156 0.808
2006 12,836 6,343 0.034 0.176 0.790
2007 12,396 6,160 0.037 0.158 0.805
2008 475 265 0.042 0.170 0.789
All years 182,266 90,885 0.043 0.197 0.761
Table 1: Basic sample characteristics 1991–2008. The sample includes only those
individuals who have an interview in the following wave and therefore includes
only interviews from wave 1–17. Displacement in this table is defined to include
redundancy, dismissal or the end of a fixed-term contract.
somewhat blurred. In particular, those answering that they were “dismissed/sacked”
may include both those who were dismissed for individual reasons as well as those whose
job was destroyed for external reasons. In contrast, Doiron and Mendolia (2011) argue
that the distinction between these two responses is important, and that individuals who
are dismissed for individual reasons may report that they were made redundant. We
examine the distinction between these two responses empirically, by testing whether post-
displacement behaviour is distinct.
The resulting data are described in Table 1. The proportion of employment spells
observed in wave t which are still in progress in wave t + 1 is between 70% and 80%. Of
those which end, approximately 18% are classified by the respondents as “displacement”
(redundancy, dismissal or temporary jobs ending). Note that the measurement of displace-
ment used here will tend to be an under-estimate for short spells of employment, because
a spell which starts after the interview in wave t and ends before the interview in wave
t+ 1 will not be recorded.
The prevalence of displacement reported in the BHPS is almost identical to the Office
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Figure 1: Estimates of probability of displacement from BHPS compared to
Office for National Statistics redundancy series (Heap, 2004). The ONS series
is calculated from the UK quarterly Labour Force Survey.
for National Statistics redundancy series calculated from the Labour Force Survey, shown
in Figure 1.19 Both series reflect the improving labour market up until the 2008–2009
recession. The incidence of temporary jobs ending is less strongly counter-cyclical, while
the dismissal rate is too small to draw conclusions.
4 Methods
We define a series of dummy variable Dci , c = 1991, . . . ,2007 which take the value 1 if
individual i experiences displacement between the wave t = c and the wave t = c + 1
interview, and Dci = 0 if they do not. Those with D
c
i = 0 will therefore include individuals
who change job between c and c+ 1 for reasons other than displacement.20 Dci is constant
for each individual for a given value of c, but each individual has a separate indicator for
19Series BEIR, calculated as the number of respondents whether working or not working, who reported
that they had been made redundant or had taken voluntary redundancy in the previous three months as a
fraction of number of employees in the previous quarter. See Heap (2004) for a discussion of ONS measure
of redundancy.
20Therefore we do not restrict the control group to include only those who continue in employment after
wave c. This contrasts with JLS, whose control group consists only of those who remain in the same firm.
Their definition of earnings losses is therefore “the change in expected earnings if . . . the worker would be
displaced . . . rather than being able to keep his or her job indefinitely.” (Jacobson et al., 1993, p.691).
Instead, our counterfactual is more general, and is intended to measure the earnings of the displaced
workers had they not been displaced. In Appendix D we demonstrate that this restriction on the control
group has a significant impact on the estimated losses.
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each cohort c. We refer to the sample with Dci = 1 as the cohort c treatment group and
those with Dci = 0 as the cohort c control group.
To construct the data for a particular cohort, we restrict the sample to all those
who are interviewed in wave c and wave c + 1, who are in employment in wave c and
aged between 20 and 60 in wave c. Note therefore that the control group for a particular
cohort may include those who are in the treatment group in other cohorts. Similarly, the
treatment group for a cohort may include those who are in the control group in other
cohorts.
Define yit to be the outcome of interest for individual i in wave t. These outcomes
include employment status (e.g. in employment, in self-employment, hours of work) and
various measures of income (e.g. income from employment, self-employment, welfare pay-
ments). yit is measured both before t ≤ c and after t > c the displacement event. We wish
to estimate the impact of Dci on yit. The least restrictive method would be to estimate a
standard difference-in-difference model separately for each displacement cohort. However,
we observe a relatively small number of displacements in each cohort (see Table 1), and so
we instead stack together cohorts and impose the restriction that the effect of displacement
relative to the displacement date is the same for each cohort.21 Once stacked, each row in
the data is identified by i, c and t because individuals may appear in several cohorts.
For those with Dci = 1 we record the date on which the displacement occurred. This
date is recorded to the nearest day, although since it comes from recall information in the
next wave of data, it seems likely to be somewhat approximate. For those with Dci = 0
we choose a random date in between the interview in waves t and t + 1, drawn from a
uniform distribution. The difference between the interview date and the displacement (or
non-displacement) date, grouped into years, is relative time, denoted rict. Thus rict = 0
in the year immediately preceding the displacement and rict = 1 in the year immediately
after. We restrict attention to −10 ≤ rict ≤ 10 to ensure sufficient numbers of treated and
control observations in each year.
21See Section 6.4 for evidence on how losses vary by cohort.
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Our principle estimating equation is then
yict = αic +
10∑
r=−9
γrT rt +
10∑
r=−4
δr(T rt Dic) + it. (1)
We include a person-cohort fixed effect αic which captures any pre-existing difference in
yit between the treatment and control groups more than five years before displacement.
The dummy variables T rt indicate time relative to the displacement event which occurs
between r = 0 and r = 1. The coefficient δr is a difference-in-difference estimate of the
effect of a displacement which occurred r years earlier. δr is estimated for five years
(r = −4,− 3, . . . ,0) before displacement to allow for the possibility that displacement has
effects before the event, and for up to 10 years (r = 1,2, . . . ,10) after displacement. We
allow the errors it to be clustered by i across cohorts. The difference-in-difference estimate
δr controls for any pre-existing difference in yit between the treatment and control groups
in the base years, which are at least five years before displacement (r = −10,−9, . . . ,−5).22
We can allow for differences in pre-existing earnings trends between the treatment and
control groups. JLS note that one can estimate this model by deviating each variable from
the person-specific time-trend (as opposed to the person-specific mean in the FE model)
and estimating by OLS. Alternatively, one can difference the data and then estimate using
FE (Wooldridge, 2010, p.375).
We can also control for differences in observable characteristics between the treat-
ment and control groups during the pre-displacement period. We do this by a combination
of one-to-one and propensity score matching, which ensures that we are comparing similar
individuals in the treatment and control groups. We match only individuals from the same
cohort. This means that individuals cannot be matched with themselves, and that indi-
viduals are matched with others who face the same aggregate labour market conditions.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), define p(xi) as the probability of experiencing
displacement in the future given a vector of characteristics xi. p(xi) is estimated using
a Probit model. The matched sample then consists of displaced and non-displaced indi-
viduals who have similar values of p̂(xi). Once a suitably matched sample is obtained,
22Choosing a base year too close to r = 0 means that any pre-displacement dip in earnings will tend to
increase the estimate of δr.
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the average effect of displacement on the displaced can be estimated by simply comparing
yit between the (matched) treatment and control groups for any value of r. One can also
use difference-in-difference models to additionally control for any level differences which
remain after matching. Using survey data allows us to estimate a rich model for p(xi)
which includes detailed pre-displacement characteristics.
5 Descriptive evidence
Before providing formal estimates of the cost of displacement, in this section we the key
patterns in the data. We show the extent to which displaced workers are non-randomly
selected, and we show the patterns of employment, earnings and income before and after
displacement.
The largest sample we use comprises all individuals who are in employment, aged
between 20 and 60 and who have information on the outcome of the employment spell in
progress at the time of the interview. Our basic definition of displacement includes re-
dundancy and dismissal, but excludes the end of temporary jobs. The resulting treatment
group comprises 2,499 individuals (37,631 observations) and the control group comprises
78,823 individuals (1,162,570 observations). The sample is illustrated in Table 2. The
number of observations declines as we move further away from the displacement event be-
cause of the start and end of the sample period. Nevertheless, we have a reasonable sample
size of displaced workers who are observed a long time before and after displacement. The
former helps us to match the control and treatment group more precisely, while the latter
allows us to measure long-run effects of displacement.
In Table 3 we compare the characteristics of the treatment and control groups 12
months before and five years before displacement. In the first column (< 12 months before
displacement) we can see that displaced workers have shorter tenure, work in smaller firms,
are more likely to work in manufacturing and in a manual occupation. They are less likely
to be union members, which reflects the fact that union membership is concentrated in the
public sector, and displaced workers are more likely to be in the private sector. Displaced
workers are more likely to be men, less likely to have a degree and less likely to be living
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Relative time
Control group
(not displaced
at r = 0)
Treatment group
(displaced
at r = 0)
r ≤ −10 >10 years before 61,728 1,574
−9 ≤ r ≤ −5 5–10 years before 153,131 4,401
r = −4 4–5 years before 49,081 1,432
r = −3 3–4 years before 55,651 1,649
r = −2 2–3 years before 62,388 1,857
r = −1 1–2 years before 70,152 2,143
r = 0 < 12 months before 78,823 2,499
r = 1 < 12 months after 78,894 2,477
r = 2 1–2 years after 73,533 2,344
r = 3 2–3 years after 68,170 2,215
r = 4 3–4 years after 62,502 2,069
r = 5 4–5 years after 56,825 1,910
6 ≤ r ≤ 10 5–10 years after 195,051 7,010
r > 10 >10 years after 96,641 4,051
Table 2: Sample sizes for treatment and control groups by relative time
with a partner. Most of these differences between the control and treatment groups are
also visible in the second column (5–6 years before displacement). In addition, workers
who are going to be displaced in five years time are much more likely to be unemployed
(7% compared to 3%).
The bottom panel of Table 3 also compares the seven outcome variables we analyse in
Section 6. 12 months before displacement, the treated have 5% lower wages and 6% higher
hours of work, consistent with the fact that the the treated are more likely to be working
full-time. Note that self-employment and benefit income are a tiny fraction of total income
because the sample is restricted to be those in employment. Differences in pay and hours
between the displaced and non-displaced five years before displacement are much smaller
and insignificantly different from zero. There are two possible explanations for the fact
that the relative earnings of the displaced workers decline prior to displacement. One is
that workers who are going to be displaced experience negative shocks to their wages and
job quality as they approach the point of displacement. The second is that the sample
observed in employment five years before displacement is a non-random selection of those
who experience displacement.
To gain an understanding of how employment patterns evolve before and after dis-
placement, Figure 2 illustrates the probability of observing the sample in different labour
market states by relative time. Panel (a) shows that one year after displacement more than
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< 12 months before
displacement
(r = 0)
5–6 years before
displacement
r = −5
Dci = 1 D
c
i = 0 p-value D
c
i = 1 D
c
i = 0 p-value
Employed 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.80 [0.011]
Self-employed 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 [0.525]
Unemployed 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 [0.000]
Other labour market state (includes missing) 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12 [0.086]
Number of times interviewed before 4.82 5.27 [0.000] 3.62 3.75 [0.149]
Number of times displaced before 0.20 0.11 [0.000] 0.13 0.09 [0.000]
Displacement cohort (BHPS wave) 9.17 10.01 [0.000] 11.71 12.01 [0.003]
Tenure (years) 4.27 5.10 [0.000] 4.14 4.55 [0.022]
Firm employs < 25 workers 0.38 0.33 [0.000] 0.29 0.32 [0.083]
Works in manufacturing 0.33 0.18 [0.000] 0.35 0.21 [0.000]
Works in manual occupation 0.48 0.40 [0.000] 0.47 0.43 [0.005]
Union member 0.36 0.52 [0.000] 0.39 0.52 [0.000]
Private sector 0.89 0.65 [0.000] 0.86 0.66 [0.000]
Works > 30 hours per week 0.85 0.80 [0.000] 0.86 0.81 [0.000]
White ethnic group 0.94 0.95 [0.055] 0.96 0.96 [0.254]
Born in UK 0.95 0.95 [0.901] 0.95 0.95 [0.983]
Lives in South East 0.23 0.22 [0.193] 0.26 0.25 [0.332]
Female 0.38 0.52 [0.000] 0.41 0.53 [0.000]
Age 38.39 39.13 [0.001] 35.46 35.57 [0.735]
Has degree 0.37 0.47 [0.000] 0.33 0.40 [0.000]
Married or cohabiting 0.70 0.75 [0.000] 0.65 0.70 [0.001]
Real monthly wage last month (£) 1481.23 1564.61 [0.001] 1213.57 1223.43 [0.772]
Real self-employment income last month (£) 0.88 6.08 [0.105] 52.93 34.67 [0.106]
Real monthly labour income last month (£) 1478.40 1553.25 [0.002] 1241.05 1249.51 [0.805]
Real benefit income last month (£) 42.23 50.36 [0.006] 57.77 55.35 [0.558]
Real monthly total income last month (£) 1562.71 1655.43 [0.000] 1342.36 1351.39 [0.792]
Total hours per week 39.94 38.22 [0.000] 32.83 32.32 [0.360]
Normal hours per week (excl. overtime) 36.19 34.25 [0.000] 29.32 28.85 [0.311]
N 2,499 78,823 1,209 42,235
Table 3: Characteristics of displaced and non-displaced workers before displacement. Both dis-
placed and non-displaced groups are selected from those aged 16–60 at the time of displacement.
Tenure, firm size, industry, occupation, union membership and hours per week refer only to those in
employment. ‘Degree’ includes university degree, teaching qualifications and any other technical,
professional or higher qualifications.
60% of the displaced are already re-employed, and this increases to over 70% two years
after displacement. After three years the probability of employment declines for both
the treatment and control groups because both groups move into other labour market
states, as shown in the remaining panels (recall that the control group are not restricted
to be those who remain with their employer). Thus, employment rates in the control
group also decline for r > 0. Panel (a) also shows clearly how the pre-displacement em-
ployment patterns differ between the two groups, with the displaced experiencing lower
pre-displacement employment rates.
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(g) Survey non-response
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
 
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time relative to displacement event (years)
(h) Mortality
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
 
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time relative to displacement event (years)
Figure 2: Probability of different self-reported labour market states before and after
displacement 1991–2007. 95% confidence intervals around the mean based on clustered
standard errors.
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An advantage of the survey data, in contrast to the administrative data available
for the UK, is that we can also calculate what happens to individuals who are not in
employment.23 This is illustrated in the remaining panels of Figure 2. Panel (b) shows
that large increases in unemployment are short-lived. In this panel we also show estimates
for three, six and nine months after displacement.24 After three months, more than 40%
of displaced workers classify themselves as unemployed, but this falls rapidly to less than
15% after 12 months. After five years, unemployment rates amongst the treatment group
are only slightly higher than in the control group. The pre-displacement difference in
unemployment rates is also very clear from panel (b).
In panel (c) we show that displacement causes a sudden burst of entry into self-
employment. After five years, 8% of displaced workers report themselves to be self-
employed, compared to 4% of the control group. Panel (d) shows that displaced workers
enter retirement more quickly in the first few years, but this effect is relatively short-lived.25
Panel (e) shows that displacement is also associated with higher rates of self-reported sick-
ness, although small sample sizes render our estimates rather imprecise after six years. The
remaining labour market states (essentially, family care and education) are shown in Panel
(f).
The employment patterns shown in Panels (a)–(f) in Figure 2 are conditional on being
interviewed: labour market status is missing for those individuals who do not participate
in the survey. However, it turns out that attrition from the panel is almost identical in
the treatment and control groups, shown in panel (g). The BHPS allows us to identify
individuals who left the survey due to death, and this is shown in panel (h). There
appears to be a small but increasing difference in mortality rates between displaced and
non-displaced workers, which is consistent with the higher self-reported levels of sickness
shown in panel (e), but note that the imprecision of the estimates means that we cannot
reject the null of no effect on mortality.
23As noted in the literature review, administrative data for some countries (in particular Norway and
Sweden) do contain information on labour market states other than employment, and also on receipt of
income from welfare payments.
24Although the survey is annual, the fact that displacement occurs at different points within the year
means that some interviews take place within three, six and nine months of the displacement date.
25Most other studies consider a younger age cut-off in order to reduce the post-displacement retirement
rate. This is usually because the studies cannot determine labour market state unless it is employment.
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To summarise, Figure 2 shows that, 10 years after displacement, there is approxi-
mately an 8 percentage point gap in employment between displaced and non-displaced
workers. This gap is made up from higher rates of unemployment (2 pp), self-employment
(3.3 pp), ill-health and mortality (0.5 pp), and other labour market states such as educa-
tion and family care (2.2 pp).
We now turn to the pattern of pay and other income following displacement. The
patterns of employment in Figure 2 show that alternative sources of income from unem-
ployment benefit, self-employment and retirement may reduce the costs of displacement.
In contrast to administrative data, our survey data sheds some light on this issue. First,
suppose that we have no information on income outside of the labour market, and we
assume that indviduals not in employment have zero income. The resulting pattern of
pay is shown in panel (a) of Figure 3. One can see that pay losses mimic very closely the
pattern of employment shown in panel (a) of Figure 2. After 10 years, pay per month in
the treatment group is £330 or 23% lower than in the control group.
If we examine only those in employment then we can estimate the loss which occurs as
a result of lower monthly pay in subsequent jobs, rather than the total loss (which includes
periods of zero earnings). The resulting estimates are shown in Panel (b) of Figure 3. In
this case after 10 years the earnings gap is £289 per month or 15%. In other words, of the
total 23% gap in earnings, about two-thirds is accounted for by a monthly earnings gap
for those in employment, and the remaining one-third by an employment gap. A couple
of other features are interesting. First, note that there is some indication of different pay
growth rates before displacement, although the effects are not large. Second, there is little
indication of any narrowing of the pay loss even after 10 years; if anything the pay gap
gets bigger.
In Panel (c) we measure total monthly labour income, which includes any earnings
from self-employment which occur after displacement. Differences between (c) and (a)
are very minor because self-employment income is relatively unimportant. Note that from
Figure 2 we know that by year 10 about 7% of the treatment group are in self-employment
compared to 4% of the control group, and including self-employment earnings reduces the
earnings gap from 23% to 18%. In Panel (d) we include gross monthly income from all
19
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only
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(c) Gross labour income last month
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(d) Gross total income last month
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Figure 3: Individual gross income by treatment and control groups. Relative time is
grouped into annual intervals. In the first panel, pay is zero for all non-employment spells.
The second panel uses only spells of employment. 95% confidence intervals around the
mean based on clustered standard errors.
sources, which includes benefit and pension payments. This only has a minor effect on
income, reducing the gap after 10 years from 18% to 16%.
6 Results
In this section we control for the pre-existing differences in levels and trends between dis-
placed and non-displaced workers, and we also ensure that displaced and non-displaced
workers are comparable by matching on their pre-existing characteristics and labour mar-
ket histories. In order to control for pre-existing differences in levels and trends in earnings,
it is important that we have sufficient pre-displacement information. For this reason we
keep only individuals in cohorts 6 (displaced after their 1996 interview) to 17 (displaced
after their 2007 interview) to ensure that all observations have at least six years of pre-
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(1)
Pay last
month
(2)
Pay last
month, emp.
spells only
(3)
Self-emp
income last
month
(4)
Total labour
income last
month
(5)
Benefit income
last month
(6)
Total income
last month
3–5 years before −0.009 −0.013 −0.011 −0.016 −0.002 −0.015
(0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018) (0.002) (0.017)
1–3 years before −0.025 −0.034∗∗ −0.013 −0.044∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.043∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.008) (0.019) (0.003) (0.018)
< 1 year before −0.037∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.046∗∗ −0.005 −0.044∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.008) (0.020) (0.003) (0.020)
< 1 year after −0.382∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.010) (0.025) (0.003) (0.024)
1–3 years after −0.259∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.250∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.224∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.011) (0.026) (0.004) (0.024)
3–5 years after −0.219∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.223∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.207∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.011) (0.027) (0.004) (0.026)
5–7 years after −0.224∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.203∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.184∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029) (0.015) (0.031) (0.005) (0.027)
7–10 years after −0.169∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ 0.030 −0.161∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.157∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.022) (0.037) (0.008) (0.032)
Number of obs. 674,022 587,332 674,022 673,813 674,022 674,022
Number of indiv. 9,648 9,637 9,648 9,648 9,648 9,648
Table 4: FE estimates of the cost of displacement on individual pay and income. Table reports
estimates of δr from Equation (1) expressed as a proportion of total income last month of the
treatment group at r = 0. Both displaced and non-displaced groups are selected from those aged
16–60, who are in employment in wave c.
displacement information. From Equation (1), note that we treat the observations r < −4
as the base period, but allow for the fact that displacement may have effects on pay in
the period −4 ≤ r ≤ 0.
We begin by reporting estimates based on unmatched displaced and non-displaced
workers which rely on fixed-effects to remove unobserved differences between the groups,
and we then report estimates based on samples matched using propensity score matching.
6.1 Unmatched samples
Our base model is Equation (1), which controls for individual fixed-effects. Results are
reported in Table 4.26 Because we may observe zero pay, we estimate (1) in unlogged
form and express the resulting coefficient estimates as a proportion of the mean pay of
displaced workers at r = 0.
26In Appendix B we compare estimates from difference-in-differences, fixed-effects, fixed-effects with
group trends and fixed-effects with individual trends.
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Column (1) of Table 4 shows some evidence of a pre-displacement effect on pay which
increases up to the point of displacement. This may either be due to pay falls within firms
(for example, employers who are in difficulty paying lower wages) or due to selection of
those who are going to be displaced into lower-paying firms. In the short-run, earnings
fall by nearly 40% and then recover, but are still 17% lower than the counterfactual after
7–10 years.
If we compare column (1) and (2) we can gauge the extent to which these losses are
caused by falls in monthly pay or differences in employment rates, because column (2) only
considers those in employment. In the short-run after displacement, 60% of the earnings
loss is due to lower employment rates, while 40% is due to lower pay (0.151/0.382). As
time passes, a larger fraction of the earnings loss is accounted for by falls in monthly pay
because a larger fraction of the displaced sample re-enters employment. In the final row
we see that 88% (0.148/0.169) of the loss is accounted for by falls in monthly pay. These
essentially replicate the patterns in the raw data shown in Figure 3.
In column (3) we show that self-employment income is unimportant in mitigating
either the short- or the long-run loss. There is a small increase in self-employment income
of about 2% (albeit imprecisely estimated after one year). In column (4) we show that
losses in total labour income (which includes self-employment income) are only slightly
smaller than the losses in earnings shown in column (1).
In column (5) we report estimates of the impact of benefit income. Recall from panel
(b) of Figure 2 that unemployment is typically a short-run experience, and as a result
benefit effects are small and short-lived. Only 21% of the displaced sample report being
unemployed one year after the displacement, and only 60% of these report receiving any
benefit income. Those who are unemployed and in receipt of benefit receive an average of
£313 per month in benefit income, which is consistent with an increase in benefit income
as a result of receiving out of work benefit (Job Seekers’ Allowance). However, this implies
that the average benefit income across the whole displaced sample is a very small fraction
of total income. The only significant effect is a 1% increase in total income in the first year
after displacement. In column (6) we take all sources of income together, which shows
that in the short-run, losses are reduced from 38% to 33%, and in the long-run losses are
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reduced from 17% to 16%.
As we noted in the introduction, administrative data do not typically allow one to
determine whether the fall in monthly pay is the result of falls in wages or falls in hours.
In Table 5 we therefore report the corresponding estimates of the effect of displacement on
normal and total hours. Normal hours are calculated from the question “Thinking about
your (main) job, how many hours, excluding overtime and meal breaks, are you expected
to work in a normal week?”. Total hours are the sum of normal hours and overtime hours,
calculated from the question “How many hours overtime do you usually work in a normal
week?”. Individuals who are not in employment are assigned zero hours of work.
Column (1) of Table 5 should be compared with the same column (1) in Table 4. In
the year immediately following displacement monthly pay is 38% lower, while total hours
are 28% lower. This is unsurprising since both include the large fraction of displaced
workers who have zero hours of employment after displacement. After 10 years, monthly
pay is 17% lower while total hours are 7% lower, suggesting that the majority of the fall in
earnings is driven by lower wages rather than lower hours of work. Column (2) of Table 5
shows how hours change conditional on being in employment. Here we see that hours of
work in the jobs in which the displaced are re-employed are approximately 5% lower, and
this fall is persistent over 10 years. This may partly be because displaced workers are
more likely to be re-employed in part-time work (Farber, 1999). It may also be because
these jobs offer less opportunity for overtime. In Column (4) we see that the fall in normal
hours is about two percentage points smaller than the fall in total hours. Nevertheless,
the results in Table 5 show that, in the long-run (after 10 years), the majority of the fall
in earnings is due to a fall in wages, not hours.
6.2 Matched samples
As shown in Table 3, the treatment and control groups differ significantly in their observ-
able characteristics before displacement occurs. To deal with this problem we use propen-
sity score matching rather than regression to ensure that all members of the treatment
and control group lie in the common region of the displacement propensity distribution.
We match within cohort, so that an individual displaced in year c is matched only with
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(1)
Total hours
per week
(2)
Total hours
per week,
emp. spells
only
(3)
Normal hours
per week
(4)
Normal hours
per week
emp. spells
only
3–5 years before 0.006 −0.012 0.010 −0.006
(0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007)
1–3 years before 0.007 −0.022∗∗ 0.018 −0.005
(0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008)
< 1 year before 0.038∗∗ −0.023∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.017) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008)
< 1 year after −0.277∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
1–3 years after −0.116∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009)
3–5 years after −0.083∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗
(0.022) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010)
5–7 years after −0.097∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012)
7–10 years after −0.068∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.046∗ −0.033∗∗
(0.029) (0.018) (0.025) (0.016)
Number of obs. 666,106 579,726 672,380 585,794
Number of indiv. 9,642 9,621 9,646 9,634
Table 5: FE estimates of the cost of displacement on individual hours. Table reports estimates of
δr from Equation (1) expressed as a proportion of the dependent variable of the treatment group
at r = 0. Both displaced and non-displaced groups are selected from those aged 16–60, who are in
employment in wave c.
individuals not displaced in year c. In our base specification we impose the restriction that
the treated and controls have common support, we allow for up to 10 nearest neighbours
and we restrict the difference in the propensity to be no more than 0.005. In other words,
the control group must have a propensity of being displaced less than 0.5% different from
the treatment group. The propensity score is generated by a Probit model on a vector xi
which contains measures of pre-displacement labour market history, firm tenure, firm size,
sector of employment, occupation, union status, ethnic group, country of birth, region,
sex, age, education and marital status. See Table C.1 in Appendix C.
In the first column of Table 6 we compare the observable characteristics of the treat-
ment and control groups in the 12 months before displacement. If one compares these
differences with those shown in Table 3 it is clear that matching has eliminated the differ-
ence between the treatment and control groups (in Appendix C we report various balancing
tests in more detail). There does remain a small difference in monthly wages and there-
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< 12 months before
displacement
5–6 years before
displacement
Dci = 1 D
c
i = 0 p-value D
c
i = 1 D
c
i = 0 p-value
Employed 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.81 [0.800]
Self-employed 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 [0.365]
Unemployed 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05 [0.076]
Other labour market state 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12 [0.109]
Number of times interviewed before 6.06 6.00 [0.677] 3.71 3.66 [0.637]
Number of times displaced before 0.23 0.23 [0.753] 0.13 0.16 [0.082]
Displacement cohort (BHPS wave) 11.79 11.79 [1.000] 11.80 11.83 [0.827]
Tenure (years) 4.57 4.56 [0.988] 4.37 4.35 [0.949]
Firm employs < 25 workers 0.38 0.38 [0.908] 0.29 0.35 [0.001]
Works in manufacturing 0.33 0.33 [0.824] 0.35 0.34 [0.657]
Works in manual occupation 0.45 0.45 [0.977] 0.46 0.48 [0.286]
Union member 0.35 0.35 [0.744] 0.40 0.39 [0.701]
Private sector 0.90 0.90 [0.949] 0.85 0.86 [0.545]
Works > 30 hours per week 0.86 0.87 [0.386] 0.86 0.85 [0.832]
White ethnic group 0.92 0.92 [0.910] 0.96 0.96 [0.788]
Born in UK 0.95 0.95 [0.891] 0.95 0.95 [0.881]
Lives in South East 0.19 0.20 [0.666] 0.26 0.25 [0.690]
Female 0.40 0.40 [0.782] 0.43 0.41 [0.154]
Age (years) 38.95 38.99 [0.910] 35.91 35.40 [0.205]
Has degree 0.41 0.41 [0.818] 0.32 0.32 [0.779]
Married or cohabiting 0.69 0.70 [0.900] 0.66 0.66 [0.981]
Real monthly wage last month (£) 1525.66 1611.44 [0.016] 1225.67 1207.73 [0.663]
Real self-employment income last month (£) 0.00 0.00 50.85 34.11 [0.482]
Real monthly labour income last month (£) 1528.57 1582.94 [0.077] 1247.88 1239.28 [0.845]
Real benefit income last month (£) 51.20 43.94 [0.098] 58.64 52.03 [0.188]
Real monthly total income last month (£) 1626.55 1680.49 [0.092] 1351.91 1333.95 [0.682]
Total hours per week (£) 39.67 40.05 [0.267] 32.83 33.45 [0.365]
Normal hours per week (excl.overtime) 36.11 36.09 [0.942] 29.40 29.87 [0.435]
N 1,413 11,125 894 7,074
Table 6: Characteristics of displaced and non-displaced workers before displacement, after propen-
sity score matching on characteristics at r = 0. “Real monthly pay” refers to pay from employment,
while “Real monthly earnings” also includes any self-employment earnings.
fore earnings at r = 0, but all other characteristics are insignificantly different between the
displaced and non-displaced samples. The second column of Table 6 provides a stronger
test of whether matching has successfully removed differences between the displaced and
non-displaced groups, because we are comparing 5–6 years before the displacement oc-
curs. Even here, matching has greatly reduced the differences between the displaced and
non-displaced groups. There remains a very small difference in unemployment propensity
(significant at 10%), but this difference is greatly reduced from the difference in unem-
ployment propensity observed in the unmatched sample. There also remains a difference
of 3 percentage points in the number of times displaced before, but in fact in this case it
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Figure 4: Probability of different self-reported labour market states before and after
displacement 1991–2007, matched samples. 95% confidence intervals around the mean
based on clustered standard errors.
is the non-displaced group who have a higher displacement rate from earlier periods.
A graphical illustration of the effectiveness of matching is provided by Figure 4,
which can be compared with the unmatched comparison in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.
After matching, the non-displaced comparison group has almost identical pattern of pre-
displacement employment and unemployment.
After matching, we estimate a difference-in-difference model, and the results are re-
ported in Table 7. Comparing column (1) between the unmatched (Table 4) and matched
(Table 7) results, we see that matching has very little effect on the estimated loss of dis-
placed workers in the first three years after displacement. However, after five years the
matching estimates are about 20% smaller (less negative), and after 10 years about 30%
smaller than those estimated from the unmatched samples. Since the treatment group
in both sets of estimates is almost identical, this tells us that the income growth of the
matched control group is worse than that of the unmatched control group. Matching
therefore reduces estimated long-run losses. Comparing column (2), the matched samples
from Table 7 also produce estimates of pay (conditional on employment) losses after 10
years which are approximately 30% smaller than the unmatched FE estimates from Ta-
ble 4. Our basic conclusions regarding the importance of other sources of labour income
and benefit income remain the same as from the unmatched FE estimates: none of these
income sources do much to mitigate losses. Column (6) shows that total income loss 7–10
years after displacement is about 10%, compared to a 12% loss in column (1).
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In Table 8 we report estimates of the effect of displacement on hours of work, after
matching. As with the income results in Table 7, matching reduces the estimated falls in
hours. In particular, column (2) of Table 8 shows that those displaced workers who are
re-employed have only marginally lower hours than the matched sample of non-displaced
workers. In other words, the 10% fall in earnings shown in column (2) of Table 7 is entirely
driven by falls in wages.
6.3 Selection into displacement
A potential bias to our estimates arises if there is a particular type of selection into
displacement. If, for example, those who are displaced are selected on the basis of a
negative shock to an unobservable characteristic (e.g. performance) which affect wages,
then we will over-estimate the cost of displacement. As noted by Gibbons and Katz
(1991), redundancies which are not caused by plant closure may allow for some discretion
in terms of who gets displaced. However, we think that this bias is unlikely to be a major
component of the observed estimate, for a number of reasons.
First, only a very specific type of selection into displacement threatens our identi-
fication strategy. The selection has to be on the basis of a shock to performance which
starts before r = 1, but it also has to be persistent from r = 1 onwards. If it reverts
after r = 1 then the long-term DiD estimates are unbiased. If selection into displacement
is on the basis of permanent differences in performance then our DiD methodology deals
with the selection. If the shock occurs before r = 0 then we can test for it by examining
the patterns of pre-displacement wages. In Table 7 estimates of δ prior to displacement
are insignificantly different from zero until r = −1. If selection into displacement is on
the basis of different pre-displacement trends in performance then our estimates which
allow for differing trends deal with selection. In Table B.1 (column 3), we show that the
difference in the pre-displacement trends are estimated to be close to zero.
Second, this particular type of selection seems much less likely to occur in a carefully
matched sample. We have already seen from the matched samples that the time-series
pattern of employment is remarkably similar for the displaced and non-displaced workers
(see Figure 4). This means that if there is still an unobserved difference in performance
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(1)
Pay last
month
(2)
Pay last
month, emp.
spells only
(3)
Self-emp
income last
month
(4)
Total labour
income last
month
(5)
Benefit income
last month
(6)
Total income
last month
3–5 years before 0.016 0.009 −0.015∗ 0.008 0.000 0.009
(0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.021) (0.003) (0.021)
1–3 years before −0.002 0.000 −0.016∗ −0.018 −0.001 −0.019
(0.021) (0.020) (0.008) (0.022) (0.003) (0.022)
< 1 year before −0.040∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.010 −0.033 0.003 −0.031
(0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022) (0.003) (0.022)
< 1 year after −0.367∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.346∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.011) (0.028) (0.004) (0.027)
1–3 years after −0.230∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.217∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.011) (0.028) (0.004) (0.027)
3–5 years after −0.179∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.181∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.165∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034) (0.011) (0.031) (0.005) (0.030)
5–7 years after −0.172∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.156∗∗∗ 0.010∗ −0.132∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.015) (0.037) (0.006) (0.035)
7–10 years after −0.120∗∗ −0.101∗ 0.014 −0.116∗∗ 0.007 −0.105∗∗
(0.051) (0.058) (0.024) (0.049) (0.009) (0.046)
Number of obs. 155,280 133,138 155,280 155,238 155,280 155,280
Number of indiv. 6,035 6,035 6,035 6,035 6,035 6,035
Table 7: PSM estimates of the cost of displacement on individual earnings and income.
(1)
Total hours
per week
(2)
Total hours
per week,
emp. spells
only
(3)
Normal hours
per week
(4)
Normal hours
per week
emp. spells
only
3–5 years before −0.011 −0.013 −0.006 −0.007
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008)
1–3 years before −0.023∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.010 −0.002
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
< 1 year before −0.009 −0.009 0.000 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
< 1 year after −0.315∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009)
1–3 years after −0.134∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008)
3–5 years after −0.092∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.089∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010)
5–7 years after −0.101∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.096∗∗∗ −0.024∗
(0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012)
7–10 years after −0.056∗ −0.012 −0.050∗ −0.011
(0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019)
Number of obs. 153,410 131,353 154,912 132,798
Number of indiv. 6,033 6,032 6,035 6,035
Table 8: PSM estimates of the cost of displacement on individual hours.
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shocks between r = 0 and r = 1 it would have to be entirely uncorrelated with earlier
shocks.
Third, redundancy criteria in the UK are made on the basis of organisational re-
quirements (such as which jobs must be lost) rather than the performance of individual
workers. In the UK, poorly-performing workers can normally be dismissed only after
formal dismissal procedures.
Finally, if negative selection were a major problem which affected self-reported mea-
sures of displacement, we expect that estimates from survey data will be systematically
larger than estimates from administrative data which use externally verified measures of
displacement. The evidence from Couch and Placzek’s (2010) literature review does not
support this assertion.
To further examine the issue of selection in the data, we consider the distinction
between those those whose job spell ended due to redundancy and those that ended due
to dismissal. We would expect that selection into displacement as a result of a shock to
performance will be more likely for those who are dismissed. Of the 2,499 displacements,
the vast majority (2,225) are “made redundant” and only 264 are “dismissed/sacked”. We
perform propensity score matching separately on each sub-group and estimate a difference-
in-difference model on the matched samples.
Table 9 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) repeat the base model for all
displacements. Columns (5) and (6) report the estimates for the “dismissal” sample.
These estimates are substantially larger, particularly for periods further away from the
displacement date. Dismissed workers’ wage losses are estimated to be around 30% of the
pre-displacement wage after 10 years, compared to only 10% for workers made redundant,
shown in columns (3) and (4). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that
selection into dismissal is more likely than selection into redundancy. However, the very
small number of dismissals means that the results would not change greatly if they are
excluded.
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All displacements Made redundant Dismissed/sacked
(1)
Pay last
month
(2)
Pay last
month, emp.
spells only
(3)
Pay last
month
(4)
Pay last
month, emp.
spells only
(5)
Pay last
month
(6)
Pay last
month, emp.
spells only
3–5 years before 0.016 0.009 0.034∗ 0.021 −0.061 −0.042
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.078) (0.079)
1–3 years before −0.002 0.000 0.024 0.018 −0.094 −0.038
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.080) (0.080)
< 1 year before −0.040∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.009 −0.013 −0.109 −0.091
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.081) (0.088)
< 1 year after −0.367∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗ −0.086
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.090) (0.110)
1–3 years after −0.230∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.093) (0.095)
3–5 years after −0.179∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.115) (0.121)
5–7 years after −0.172∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.142) (0.135)
7–10 years after −0.120∗∗ −0.101∗ −0.098∗ −0.093 −0.300∗ −0.296∗
(0.051) (0.058) (0.054) (0.063) (0.176) (0.162)
Number of obs. 155,280 133,138 142,953 122,975 13,476 10,912
Number of indiv. 6,035 6,035 5,651 5,651 1,087 1,087
Table 9: DiD estimates on matched samples, comparison of displacement type.
6.4 Losses by cohort
The pooled models impose the restriction that the effect of displacement relative to the
displacement date is the same for all cohorts. For example, the effect of displacement in
2000 on an individual’s earnings in 2002 is the same as the effect of displacement in 2002
on an individual’s earnings in 2004. The structure of our data implies that estimates of the
loss for periods further from the displacement event are identified by earlier cohorts, since
later cohorts are followed for a shorter period of time. Davis and von Wachter (2011) show
that the cost of displacement varies substantially across cohorts, depending in particular
on economic conditions at the time of displacement: workers displaced in a downturn
suffer much larger losses. Thus, it is possible that the slow recovery in earnings may be
driven by that fact that earlier cohorts were displaced during the weaker labour market
in the early 1990s. In Figure 5 we report estimates of (1) for four displacement cohorts.
To maintain reasonable sample size, each cohort comprises three years: 1996–1998, 1999–
2001, 2002–2005 and 2006–2008.
It is clear that the pattern of earnings recovery is very similar across cohorts, and
there is no systematic change in the rate of recovery over the sample period. This may be a
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Figure 5: FE estimates by cohort (each cohort contains three years). Dotted line
indicates average across all cohorts.
result of the fact that business cycle fluctuations were small over the sample period (which
pre-dates the “Great Recession” of 2008–2009), and therefore the time-series pattern of
earnings recovery is unlikely to be affected by the business cycle.
6.5 Further robustness checks
Our strategy in this paper is to provide estimates of the cost of displacement based on
the largest sample of displaced workers. In part this is driven by the relatively small
numbers of displaced workers observed in the survey data, but also by a desire to provide
estimates which are representative of all displacements. In contrast, much of the literature,
following JLS, restricts the group of displaced workers in various dimensions, such as
age, firm tenure and the observation of post-displacement earnings. In Appendix D we
investigate the impact of various sampling decisions on the estimated loss. We show that
most of these decisions have only a small impact on estimated losses, consistent with
findings from the US, as in von Wachter et al. (2009). The most significant sampling
decision is that which relates to the control group. If the control group is restricted to
include only those who remain with their employer from r > 0 onwards, estimated losses
are larger and there is no recovery in relative pay because the control group have faster
growth in pay.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we provide comprehensive evidence of the costs of job displacement in the
UK. We consider short- and long-term losses, the effect of welfare payments, the effect of
transitions into other labour market states, and the distinction between hours and wages.
Further, we are able to precisely match displaced workers with a comparable control
group using detailed pre-displacement characteristics. Once matched, the displaced and
non-displaced samples exhibit very similar pre-displacement trends in both employment
patterns and earnings.
Earnings losses in the short-run are almost 40% of pre-displacement earnings; after
10 years losses are approximately 10% of pre-displacement earnings. Our estimates of the
total loss lie in between the estimated losses from firm closure and mass-layoffs reported
by Hijzen et al. (2010). This is consistent with the fact that our self-reported measure of
displacement in this paper is a mixture of firm-closure and other layoff events.
We find that the majority of the long-run loss (80%) is accounted for by a reduction
in post-displacement monthly pay. This is consistent with evidence from the US, and
paints rather a different picture of the UK labour market to Hijzen et al. (2010), who
use employer survey data linked to firm register data, and who find that the majority of
the earnings loss is accounted for by lower employment rates rather than lower pay. It
seems plausible that workers who are displaced are less likely to reappear in the employer
survey data if low-paying employers are less likely to respond to the survey. This would
explain why the earlier work finds lower post-displacement employment rates and higher
post-displacement wage rates. In contrast, in the current study the response rates do not
differ between those who are displaced and not displaced (see Figure 2, panel g).
In addition, in this paper we are able to match displaced workers to a control group
on the basis of a detailed set of pre-displacement characteristics. We are also able to show
that the majority of the earnings loss is caused by falls in wages rather than falls in hours
of work. Our findings suggest that the consequences of displacement in the UK are closer
to those found in the US literature than previously thought.
We find that income from other labour market states and from welfare payments
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does little to compensate. Total income from other sources, including self-employment
income, unemployment insurance, retirement income and invalidity benefit reduce losses
by only 15% in the first 12 months after displacement, and by about 12% after 10 years.
The relative unimportance of welfare payments provides an explanation as to why losses
in the UK appear so similar to those found for the US, and contrast to losses from Nordic
countries which are typically rather smaller.
The use of survey data has some limitations. First, our measure of displacement is
self-reported rather than inferred from plant closings or mass-layoffs. It has been argued
(e.g. Topel, 1990) that respondents are more likely to report more costly events (such as
displacements which result in long spells of unemployment), especially after a long lag.
However, we mitigate this by only using recall information from the previous calendar
year. Recent evidence from the US from Couch and Placzek (2010, p.587) suggests that
estimated earnings losses from survey data are actually quite similar to those from admin-
istrative data. Second, self-reported displacement might also mix up genuinely exogenous
separations (such as those caused by plant closures or reductions in employment) with
dismissals which may be related to individual shocks to performance. However, we have
shown that the great majority of layoffs are reported as redundancies, and that excluding
dismissals from the sample does not substantially reduce the estimated loss.
Our results show that the UK labour market is “flexible” in the sense that most
displaced workers are able to re-enter employment relatively quickly after displacement,
and in the long-term, unemployment rates are only slightly higher for displaced workers
compared to the control group. This reflects the fact that government policy has made
it increasingly unrewarding and difficult to claim unemployment benefits for an extended
period (Manning, 2009). This flexibility, however, does not mean that displacement is
painless. First, in the short term, welfare payments represent only a small fraction of
lost earnings. Second, in the long term, displaced workers face substantial downgrading
of their pay. This may be a combination of the fact that they find work in low-paying
firms, and the fact that they lose specific human capital. One important future research
question is then to investigate the extent to which a lack of regional and occupational
mobility prevents the efficient re-allocation of workers from shrinking firms and sectors to
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new jobs in growing firms and sectors. A second is to evaluate the effectiveness of specific
government interventions intended to support displaced workers and communities which
have experienced mass-layoff events.27
27For example, the closure of the Redcar steelworks in October 2015 led to a £80m support package,
approximately £25,000 per displaced worker. As of October 2016, no information on the effectiveness of
this support was available (Tighe, 2016).
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Appendix A Using job history data to create detailed dis-
placement information
The data are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) waves 1-18, 1991–
2008. The 18 waves contain 32,379 individuals and 238,992 person-years. We keep mem-
bers of the original sample and full interview outcomes, resulting in 29,264 individuals and
219,592 records.
The start date of the labour market spell in progress at the time of interview is asked
to the day. However, missing values are quite common.28 If the start day is unknown we
assume the first day of the month. If the start month is unknown we assume January.29
After making these changes there are just 5,134 records with a missing start date. These
are records where the start year is unknown. In addition, a very small number of records
(less than 0.05%) have a start or end date that is inconsistent with the date of interview;
these dates are approximated by the interview date.
Information on the reason for the end of employment spells is available from a re-
spondent’s employment history data. If the spell in progress at the time of the interview
starts after 1st September in the previous interview year then the employment history data
contains recall information on all spells going back until a spell start date occurs before
1st September in the previous year. In total there are 67,125 labour market spells in the
employment history data, of which 40,837 refer to spells of employment. Respondents are
asked “which of the statements on the card best describes why you stopped doing that
job?”:
1. Promoted
2. Left for a better job
3. Made redundant
4. Dismissed/sacked
5. Temporary job ended
2851% of records from the current labour market data have a missing start day, 14% have a missing
start month and 1% have a missing start year. 56% of records from the employment history data have a
missing start day, 11% have a missing start month and 3% have a missing start year.
29In some cases the start month is coded as “Spring”, “Summer”, “Autumn” or “Winter”. We recode
these as April, July, October and January respectively.
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Reason for
ending job
All emp.
spells
. . . in progress
at date of
last interview
. . . with consistent
status at
last interview
Made redundant 4,349 2,717 2,523
Dismissed or sacked 886 419 361
Temporary job ended 3,947 1,291 1,061
Other reason 31,275 19,398 18,118
Unknown 380 157 121
Total 40,837 23,982 22,184
Table A.1: Number of displacements observed 1991–2009. Based on answers to the question ‘tell
me which of the statements on the card best describes why you stopped doing that job?”
6. Took retirement
7. Health reasons
8. Left to have a baby
9. Look after family
10. Look after another person
11. Other reason
The broadest definition of displacement includes those spells which are reported to
end in (3) “made redundant”, (4) “dismissed or sacked” or (5) “temporary job ended”.
Under this broad definition there are over 8,000 displacements (4,349+886+3,947), as
shown in the first column of Table A.1. However, not all of these jobs were in progress at
the time of the last interview. Restricting to those spells which were in progress at the
time of the last interview reduces the number of displacements observed to just over 4,400
(2,717+419+1,291). Note that the majority of temporary jobs which ended were not in
progress at the time of the last interview, which makes sense since these will tend to be
shorter spells.
However, there are discrepancies between the information in the employment history
data and the contemporaneous data. The earliest spell in the employment history data
should be the spell which was in progress during the last interview. In the final column of
Table A.1 we count only spells which were recorded as “in paid employment” at the time
of the last interview. This results in a total of 3,945 (2,523+361+1,061) displacements of
jobs which were in progress at the time of the previous interview date.
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Year
Made
redundant
Dismissed
or sacked
Temp. job
ended
Other
reason
Spell not
ended
Outcome
not known
Total
1991 178 15 45 688 3,167 880 4,973
1992 159 25 56 720 2,892 623 4,475
1993 122 20 48 744 2,848 525 4,307
1994 123 16 63 806 2,869 561 4,438
1995 119 19 58 763 3,035 421 4,415
1996 103 19 56 914 3,185 418 4,695
1997 106 23 68 948 3,085 501 4,731
1998 115 7 67 965 3,058 519 4,731
1999 128 15 62 1,033 3,342 601 5,181
2000 165 28 65 1,279 4,018 832 6,387
2001 227 24 81 1,523 6,012 1,273 9,140
2002 187 14 77 1,447 5,385 1,109 8,219
2003 160 20 73 1,506 5,616 1,200 8,575
2004 147 30 60 1,365 5,042 888 7,532
2005 150 27 62 1,039 5,391 831 7,500
2006 130 23 63 1,115 5,012 817 7,160
2007 153 25 51 975 4,956 786 6,946
2008 7 1 3 45 209 6,539 6,804
Total 2,479 351 1,058 17,875 69,122 19,530 110,415
Table A.2: Number of displacements from employment spells in progress at interview date. The
column labelled “not known” includes all spells for which no reason is given for ending a job. A
small number of interviews took place in 2009, which is why a few displacements are observed in
2008.
We then attach the information on displacement to the previous interview, so that
for each spell in progress at the time of interview we have information on how that spell
ended (if it ended before the next interview). From the original sample of 219,592 interview
records, 110,415 interviews occur during a spell of employment. For 19,530 of these spells
we do not know whether or how it ended, either because there was no interview in the
following year (15,650) or there is incomplete information from the employment history
data (3,880). Table A.2 summarises the number of displacements. Stata code which
constructs the data as described is available from the authors on request.
Appendix B DiD vs. FE vs. time-trends estimates
In this section we compare the difference between estimating a basic DiD model which con-
trols for differences in group means, our preferred FE specification (1), a FE specification
which allows for differences in trends, and our PSM estimate.
Column (1) reports the basic DiD model. The estimate of β is insignificantly different
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(1)
DiD
(2)
FE
(3)
FE +
group trends
(4)
FE +
indiv.trends
(5)
PSM +
DiD
β −0.013 −0.013
(0.023) (0.023)
ω −0.002
(0.005)
3–5 years before −0.009 −0.009 −0.002 −0.013 0.016
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
1–3 years before −0.025 −0.025 −0.015 −0.051∗ −0.002
(0.020) (0.018) (0.027) (0.029) (0.021)
< 1 year before −0.038∗ −0.037∗ −0.024 −0.066∗ −0.040∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.039) (0.022)
< 1 year after −0.384∗∗∗ −0.382∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗ −0.367∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.042) (0.052) (0.028)
1–3 years after −0.249∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.048) (0.061) (0.027)
3–5 years after −0.200∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.059) (0.075) (0.032)
5–7 years after −0.215∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.031) (0.068) (0.088) (0.036)
7–10 years after −0.197∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.143∗ −0.279∗∗ −0.120∗∗
(0.049) (0.042) (0.080) (0.114) (0.051)
Number of obs. 674,022 674,022 674,022 599,059 155,280
Number of indiv. 9,648 9,648 9,648 9,467 6,035
Table B.1: Comparison of DiD, FE, FE with time-trend and PSM estimates of the cost of displace-
ment on individual monthly earnings. Table reports estimates of δr from variants of Equation (1),
expressed as a proportion of the dependent variable of the treatment group at r = 0. β is the
coefficient on a treatment dummy in a model without individual fixed effects. ω is the coefficient
on a treatment dummy interacted with a linear time trend. Both displaced and non-displaced
groups are selected from those aged 16–60, who are in employment in wave c.
from zero, demonstrating that in the base period (more than five years before displace-
ment) there is no significant difference in monthly earnings. There is a small decrease in
earnings in the pre-displacement period of up to 3.8%. Short-term losses are 38% (< 1
year after) and long-term losses (7–10 years after) are 20%.
Column (2) reports our base model (1), which yields very similar results but with
slightly smaller long-term losses. The difference between (1) and (2) occurs because our
sample is an unbalanced panel: each cohort has a different number of pre- and post-
displacement observations.
Column (3) reports a variant of (1) which also allows for a pre-displacement group
trend difference (i.e. a time-trend interacted with the displacement dummy). The estimate
of ω suggests that the displaced had very slightly lower pre-displacement earnings growth
(note that this is earnings growth in the period r < −4) but this effect is not significantly
different from zero. Because the difference in pre-displacement earnings growth is small,
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this model yields similar estimates to the base model. In column (4) we report estimates
of a model which allows for an individual-specific time-trend. This model produces signif-
icantly larger estimates of earnings losses, because the pre-displacement earnings growth
of the displaced group is estimated to be faster, on average, than the control group. How-
ever, we treat these estimates with some caution because estimates of ωic are based on
relatively few time periods and lead to a loss of precision of all the estimates – note that
the standard errors in column (4) are typically twice as large as the standard errors in
column (2).
Finally in column (5) we report our PSM estimate. As noted in the main text, the
use of PSM effectively removes a large number of observations from the control group
which are not observably similar to those in the control group. Doing this reduces the
long-term estimate somewhat, but has little difference on the estimated losses immediately
after displacement.
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Appendix C Matching results
N Mean S.D. Min Max
No. of waves since first appearance 52,673 7.39 4.35 1 17
No. of time displaced before 52,673 0.14 0.41 0 6
No. of times in self-employment before 52,673 0.13 0.74 0 16
No. of times unemployed before 52,673 0.16 0.59 0 12
No. of times in other labour market state before 52,673 0.64 1.56 0 15
No. of times interviewed before 52,673 6.19 4.35 0 16
Current tenure in firm 52,673 5.29 6.16 0 50
Current firm employs < 25 workers 52,673 0.33 0.47 0 1
Current firm in manufacturing sector 52,673 0.17 0.38 0 1
Current job in manual occupation 52,673 0.38 0.49 0 1
Current workplace has union representation 52,673 0.52 0.50 0 1
Current firm is in private sector 52,673 0.65 0.48 0 1
Current job is full-time ≥ 30 hours per week) 52,673 0.80 0.40 0 1
White ethnic group 52,673 0.94 0.24 0 1
Born in UK 52,673 0.95 0.21 0 1
Lives in South East 52,673 0.19 0.39 0 1
Female 52,673 0.52 0.50 0 1
Age 52,673 39.71 10.65 20 60
Age2 52,673 1690.16 855.54 400 3600
Has higher education 52,673 0.50 0.50 0 1
Married 52,673 0.76 0.43 0 1
Table C.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation of the propensity score.
All displacement cohorts together, calculated at r = 0 i.e. the interview immediately before
displacement.
In Table C.1 we report descriptive statistics of the variables used in the propensity
score matching. In Table C.2 we report a set of balancing statistics comparing the displaced
and non-displaced samples before and after propensity score matching. Each displacement
cohort is matched separately, ensuring that a displaced worker is only matched with a non-
displaced worker from the same cohort. Columns (3) and (4) report the sample sizes before
and after matching, which show that almost all displaced workers appear in the matched
samples. Columns (5) and (6) report the number of t-tests of the difference in means
between the control and treatment groups which are significantly different from zero at
the 95% and 90% significance levels. Column (7) reports the median bias of all covariates
before and after matching. Columns (8) and (9) report Rubin’s B and Rubin’s R statistics.
In Figure C.1 we show how matching successfully removes pre-existing differences in
pay and employment status between the displaced and non-displaced samples. Panels (a)
and (c) show that the displaced sample is less likely to be in employment and more likely
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cohort
N (non-
displaced)
N
(displaced)
Balancing
t-tests
5%
Balancing
t-tests
10%
Median
bias
B R
6 Unmatched 2,909 89 3/21 6/21 7.982 66.396 0.773
6 Matched 753 89 0/21 0/21 2.005 17.059 1.064
7 Unmatched 2,922 87 8/21 8/21 10.423 79.289 0.992
7 Matched 681 86 0/21 0/21 1.874 16.601 0.831
8 Unmatched 2,851 80 7/21 7/21 12.972 91.205 0.576
8 Matched 609 80 0/21 0/21 2.551 16.340 0.775
9 Unmatched 4,046 139 8/21 9/21 12.509 84.490 0.741
9 Matched 1,053 139 0/21 1/21 2.657 17.833 0.708
10 Unmatched 4,495 130 10/21 12/21 17.491 98.912 0.855
10 Matched 964 127 0/21 0/21 1.739 15.512 0.861
11 Unmatched 5,283 138 8/21 11/21 14.578 86.876 0.643
11 Matched 1,063 137 1/21 1/21 2.550 17.239 1.435
12 Unmatched 5,190 154 10/21 10/21 12.443 103.774 0.508
12 Matched 1,139 152 0/21 0/21 1.663 15.486 1.088
13 Unmatched 4,908 120 9/21 10/21 14.183 91.622 0.579
13 Matched 985 119 0/21 0/21 3.023 16.542 0.757
14 Unmatched 4,883 130 11/21 13/21 17.578 103.771 0.592
14 Matched 986 128 0/21 0/21 1.787 14.249 0.915
15 Unmatched 4,760 120 9/21 11/21 16.075 78.773 1.004
15 Matched 1,004 119 0/21 0/21 1.064 9.650 0.959
16 Unmatched 4,574 119 7/21 8/21 8.017 82.487 0.636
16 Matched 947 119 0/21 0/21 2.499 18.099 0.784
17 Unmatched 4,428 118 10/21 10/21 14.206 74.822 0.837
17 Matched 941 118 0/21 0/21 1.675 12.774 0.956
Table C.2: Samples sizes and outcomes of matching. Table reports number of observations at
r = 0 (immediately before displacement) before and after matching. All statistics calculated using
psmatch2 provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2014).
to be unemployed before displacement, but these differences are removed in the matched
samples in panels (b) and (d). Similarly, panels (e) and (g) show that some indication
that pay growth is lower in the displaced sample. But panels (f) and (h) show that after
matching there is no difference either in the level or trend of pay before displacement.
Appendix D Alternative control groups
Starting with our baseline sample of 2,499 displaced workers (row 1), we first restrict
the sample to those displaced between 1996 and 2007 (row 2) to allow for sufficient pre-
displacement information. JLS restrict the sample to those who are aged 21–50 at the
time of displacement (row 3). They consider only workers in firms employing at least 50
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(g) Pay last month, emp. spells only (un-
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Figure C.1: Comparison of employment status and pay before and after matching.
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Sample Treatment Control
Prop. of
sample
(1) In employment at r = 0 aged ≥ 20 and ≤ 60 2,499 78,823
(2) In cohort 1996 . . . 2007 1,788 61,783
(3) Aged ≥ 21 and ≤ 50 at r = 0 1,352 48,381 78%
(4) Working in a firm employing at least 50 people at r = 0 646 25,896 42%
(5) At least six years of tenure at r = 0 126 6,154 10%
(6) Have positive earnings in each calendar year after displacement 88 4,802 7%
(7) Remain with same employer from r = 0 onwards 88 3,164 5%
Table D.1: Sampling restrictions made by JLS. See in particular Jacobson et al. (1993, Appendix
C, p.708).
people (row 4).30 They also consider only “high tenure” separators who have at least six
years of tenure (row 5), which leaves us with just 10% of the original sample. They also
consider only workers who have positive wage or salary earnings in each calendar year (row
6). Finally, the control group used by JLS consists only of those who remain with the
same employer (row 7). It is clear from Table D.1 that these sample restrictions remove
the great majority of displaced workers from the sample.
(1)
Full
sample
(2)
Age
21–50
at r = 0
(3)
Firm employs
≥50
at r = 0
(4)
Tenure
≥ 6
at r = 0
(5)
+ve earnings
in each
year r > 0
(6)
Control group
remains with
same firm
3–5 years before 0.016 0.039∗ −0.003 0.055∗ 0.015 0.030
(0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.024) (0.022)
1–3 years before −0.002 0.034 0.023 0.056∗ 0.006 0.001
(0.021) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.024) (0.024)
< 1 year before −0.040∗ −0.006 −0.032 0.018 −0.016 −0.039
(0.022) (0.024) (0.032) (0.034) (0.024) (0.026)
< 1 year after −0.367∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ −0.455∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.045) (0.062) (0.034) (0.032)
1–3 years after −0.230∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.042) (0.052) (0.032) (0.032)
3–5 years after −0.179∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.048) (0.067) (0.040) (0.040)
5–7 years after −0.172∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗ −0.153∗ −0.108∗∗ −0.382∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.042) (0.056) (0.079) (0.044) (0.047)
7–10 years after −0.120∗∗ −0.038 −0.128 −0.075 −0.061 −0.374∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.057) (0.080) (0.113) (0.062) (0.067)
No. of obs. 155,280 114,778 74,433 37,636 102,566 105,704
No. of indiv. 6,035 4,757 3,343 1,571 3,569 3,556
Table D.2: Comparison of different control groups.
Because of the small resulting sample size, it is not practical to estimate the costs
of displacement while imposing all these sample restrictions simultaneously. Instead, in
Table D.2 we report the effect of each sample restriction in turn. Column (1) repeats our
30They make this restriction to ensure that their definition of “mass-layoff” is meaningful.
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baseline estimate. Column (2) shows that losses for the younger sample (which excludes
most of those who retire) are smaller, and in particular the final row suggests that this
younger sample experience a stronger recovery in earnings. Note that this is not due to
a difference in retirement behaviour, since we have established that retirement differences
between displaced and non-displaced workers have disappeared after 10 years (see panel
(d) of Figure 2).
Column (3) shows that workers displaced from large firms experience larger falls in
earnings initially (−45% as opposed to −37% in the baseline sample), but this difference
is largely eliminated after 10 years. Column (4) shows a similar picture for high-tenure
workers: larger initial falls, but the difference disappears after 10 years. Column (5) shows
that the earnings restriction reduces estimated earnings losses, which is unsurprising since
some of the earnings loss is a result of periods of non-employment. The most significant
sampling decision is shown in Column (6). If the control group is restricted to those who
remain in the sample employer, the recovery in earnings is almost completely eliminated,
because the control group’s earnings remain much higher.
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